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ABSTRACT




We consider here two essential technologies of Intelligent Transportation System
(ITS): Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication.
In Chapter II, we present a method to automatically control a platoon of vehicles
equipped with V2V devices. One of the major issues with platoon control is latency
in wireless communications. Latency has a negative impact on safety and disrupts
the stability of platoons. We propose a decentralized longitudinal platoon-controlling
mechanism that uses a Model Predictive Control (MPC) approach to ensure vehicles
safety, even in high-latency communications environments. The sensitivity of this
method is analyzed to derive the conditions for the safety of the vehicles in the
platoon. A simulation test bed for this control method is implemented to test its
effectiveness and safety under two communications latency settings. The results show
that the model predictive control method can safely control the platoon even in high-
latency communications environments.
In Chapter III, we propose a combinatorial auction implemented via a V2I system
to toll and allocate traffic to eliminate congestion on a sub-network of links. We de-
viii
sign a Vickrey-Clarke-Groove (VCG) type auction mechanism, which enables vehicles
to bid for paths through V2I devices before entering the network. Using the individ-
ual vehicle bids, an optimization problem is formulated and solved, to generate the
assignment of vehicles to paths and the corresponding tolls. The underlying model is
analyzed for its special properties. We prove that this auction mechanism guarantees
truthful reporting and maximizes the social utility. We then test this auction mecha-
nism in two numerical experiments: first with a network of 6 links and 5100 vehicles,
and then in a network with 98 links and 12000 vehicles. We prove that in a multiple
origin-destination network, it is necessary to add an additional free path for each ori-
gin destination pair, in order to guarantee that the toll is always no greater than the
bid made by the vehicle. We also discuss various implementation issues of this model,
including use of a rolling horizon for multiple-round auctions, and the potential of
this auction system as a toll setting mechanism for High-Occupancy Vehicle (HOV)
or (High-Occupancy Tolled) HOT lanes.
ix
CHAPTER I
Introduction - Intelligent Transportation System
An Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) incorporates various advanced tech-
nologies, such as wireless communication, navigation, sensing, and computing tech-
nologies, to make the transportation system safer, more efficient, more ‘intelligent’,
enables more convenient, and informed travel for users. Examples of ITS applica-
tions range from basic car navigation and traffic signal control, to more advanced
emergency notification and collision avoidance system.
Wireless communication is an essential part of the intelligent transportation sys-
tem. It enables Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) commu-
nication, which allow the exchange of important traffic information, such as speed,
road condition, electronic tolling, etc., among different vehicles, as well as between
vehicles and the infrastructure. These wireless communication are implemented on
Dedicated Short-Range Communications (DSRC) devices. DSRC provides one-way
or two-way short- to medium-range wireless communication channels specifically de-
signed for automotive use and a corresponding set of protocols and standards. Pro-
tocols such as IEEE 802.11p, has been developed to enable DSRC communication. A
spectrum has been allocated for DSRC use, for example, the 5.850-5.925 GHz band
in USA, and the 5.855 MHz to 5.925 GHz band in Europe. In this dissertation, we
study two applications of ITS, respectively using V2V and V2I communication.
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V2V devices enable the exchange of information among vehicles. Based on these
information, in Chapter II, we develop a mechanism that can automatically control
a platoon of vehicles. Vehicle platooning is a method of increasing road capacity by
grouping vehicles in a tightly-spaced formation. In order to form a safe and efficient
platoon, wireless communication has to be used to exchange the accelerating and
braking information among vehicles. One of the major issues with platoon control
is latency in wireless communications. Latency has a negative impact on safety and
disrupts the stability of platoons. We propose a decentralized longitudinal platoon-
controlling mechanism that uses a Model Predictive Control (MPC) approach to
control vehicles safely, even in high-latency communication environments. The sen-
sitivity of this method is analyzed to derive the conditions for this method to work
safely. A simulation test bed for this control method is implemented to test effective-
ness and safety under two communication latency settings. The results show that the
model predictive control method can safely control the platoon even in high-latency
communications environments.
On the other hand, V2I devices can be used to implement an effective tolling
mechanism to resolve traffic congestion. In Chapter III, we develop a combinatorial
auction system implemented via V2I devices to toll and allocate traffic and reduce
congestion. We design a Vickrey-Clarke-Groove (VCG) type auction, which enables
vehicles to bid for paths through V2I devices before entering the network. After col-
lecting bids, an optimization problem is solved, and the system assigns vehicles to
paths and computes the corresponding toll. A mathematical model of this auction is
presented and analyzed. We prove that this auction mechanism guarantees truthful
reporting and maximizes the social utility. Then we test the auction in two experi-
ments: first in a network with 6 links and 5100 vehicles, then in a network with 98
links and 12000 vehicles. We prove that in a multiple origin-destination network, an
additional free path can guarantee that the toll is always no greater than the bid of a
2
Figure 1.1: Framework of Combined V2V and V2I Applications
vehicle. We also discuss various implementation issues of this model, including using
rolling horizon for multiple-round auction, and the potential of this auction system
as a toll setting mechanism for HOV or HOT lanes.
These two applications of V2V and V2I can be implemented separately, or com-
bined as an integrated framework for a more efficient and safer transportation sys-
tem. When these two applications are used together, V2V and V2I applications
can be implemented on microscopic and macroscopic level, respectively. Traffic in
the microscopic level is optimized through vehicle platooning, using V2V technology,
which reduces fuel consumption and improves safety. The macroscopic level traffic
is optimized through an auction system and implemented via V2I devices, reducing
congestion and travel time of vehicles. More specifically, vehicles would be efficiently
assigned to paths (and tolled correspondingly) by the auction mechanism described in
Chapter III, and during their trip, vehicles sharing the same path can be grouped into




Vehicle Platoon Control in High-Latency Wireless
Communications Environment
2.1 Introduction
Due to the ever increasing transportation demand throughout the world, traffic
congestion and safety become more and more important issues. One way to reduce
the impact of congestion and improve safety is to use Intelligent Transportation Sys-
tem (ITS) (Horowitz and Varaiya, 2000; Varaiya and Shladover , 1991). The idea is
to increase the capacity of highway by automatically coordinating and controlling
vehicles to form vehicle platoons, in which vehicles are kept at a small spacing from
each other. (Varaiya, 1993). To facilitate the exchange of control information, ve-
hicles are equipped with wireless communication devices, also known as Dedicated
Short-Range Communication (DSRC) devices. Protocols such as IEEE 802.11p, have
been developed to enable vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V) or vehicle-to-infrastructure (V2I)
communication (AST, 2003).
The benefit of using ITS includes increased highway capacity, improved safety and
increased fuel efficiency. It has been shown that by using accurate sensors and appro-
priate vehicle control algorithm, one can significantly improve the highway capacity
(Rajamani and Shladover , 2001). Meanwhile, highway safety can also be improved
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by broadcasting emergency messages to the entire platoon so that vehicles can brake
in advance to avoid collision (Biswas et al., 2001). ITS also has the potential to re-
duce fuel consumption because vehicle driving are better coordinated through wireless
communication, thus reduce the amount of unnecessary acceleration or deceleration
for each vehicle (Baskar et al., 2011).
Early attempts to implement the idea of automatic vehicle control was conducted
by PATH program at University of California at Berkeley since 1990s. (Shladover
et al., 1991) uses the concept of vehicle-follower control (trying to maintain cer-
tain spacing with other vehicles) rather than point-follower control (trying to follow
markers along the road), to operate vehicles in very close-formation platoons. In
this chapter, a hierarchical control scheme was introduced to accommodate the non-
linear dynamics of vehicle mechanical system (engine, transmission and drive-train).
This chapter also has a thorough discussion of communication methods and channel
capacity requirements.
A safe control system requires sophisticated methods to handle the latency or
delays brought by both vehicle’s mechanical system and communication systems.
Besides mechanical latency, a challenge of developing safe intelligent vehicle control
system is to adequately information delay. The relatively narrow radio spectrum
and competing nature of wireless communication limits the data rates on the wire-
less channel (Gupta and Kumar , 2000). Moreover, the channel may be noisy and
unreliable, due to the reflections and attenuation of the wireless signal being trans-
mitted. These effects inevitably introduce some random delay and packet losses (Liu
et al., 2001). Experiments have for instance shown that latency is much higher in
urban highway than in open field (Bai and Krishnan, 2006), as a result of the signal
distortions caused by the structure of buildings and highways.
A high number of vehicles using DSRC devices to exchange information may also
eventually cause channel congestion, and thus higher packet loss ratios. According
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to the study in (Huang et al., 2010), latency also depends on the protocols used to
implement the wireless data transmissions. The chapter notably pointed out that a
trade-off exists between message transmission rate and packet-loss ratio: if we try
to increase the transmission rate, channel congestion will more likely happen, thus
increasing the packet-loss ratio, and vice versa. Therefore, a sophisticated wireless
channel control is needed to maintain a desirable latency level.
Communication delay may have two negative impacts on the automatic vehicle
control system: increased risk of collision and violation of string stability. It has
been shown in (Liu et al., 2006) that information delay more than 0.5 seconds would
increase probability of collision significantly.
Another issue of controlling a platoon of vehicles is string stability. String stability
of a platoon refers to a property that guarantees the spacing error does not amplify as
it propagates along a string of vehicles (Swaroop and Hedrick , 1996). Control methods
were proposed to handle constant information delays using leading and preceding car
information (Rajamani and Zhu, 2002). However, as is shown in (Liu et al., 2001;
Middleton and Braslavsky , 2010), such systems do not necessarily create string stable
platoons when they only consider information delay with the leading or preceding
car. Other method to control a platoon of vehicles includes parallel estimation (Smith
and Hadaegh, 2007), where each vehicle first estimate the state of entire platoon, and
then update its estimates by communicating with other vehicles, and receding horizon
control algorithms (Dunbar and Caveney , 2012) In this case, a special communication
network topology need to be considered to achieve stability.
This chapter is organized as follows. Section II describes the goals and assumptions
of the project. Section III describes the model based predictive control (MPC) method
we use to control vehicle platoons. Section IV presents an analysis of the effectiveness
and robustness of the MPC method, while Section V presents the simulation results
of MPC control model. Conclusion and future research are discussed in Section VI.
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2.2 Goals and Assumptions
2.2.1 Goals
We want to develop a higher-lever longitudinal control algorithm (details discuss
in the next section) for a vehicle platoon that can work under unreliable wireless
communication environment and achieve the following goals:
1. Improve highway safety
2. Increase highway capacity
3. Improve energy efficiency
2.2.2 Hierarchy of Control
Two types of control that are crucial to control intelligent vehicles: longitudinal
control (throttle and brake) and lateral control (steering). In this chapter, we assume
that lateral control can be readily established by a separate controller, and focus
primarily on the longitudinal control aspect.
When making longitudinal control decisions, we further assume use of a hierar-
chical control system implementing an upper and lower control level similar to the
one described in (Rajamani et al., 2000). At each time step, it is assumed that the
upper level controller determines the desired acceleration for each vehicle based on
the following two objectives:
1) maintain appropriate spacing between cars
2) ensure string stability of the platoon
The acceleration decision is made based on perceived state of other vehicles. Because
of communication latency, outdated information regarding the position and velocity of
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surrounding vehicles may be used in the decisions. Once determined, the acceleration
or deceleration decision is passed to the lower level controller to be executed.
The lower level controller is responsible for applying the throttle and brake ac-
tuator to ensure that the desired acceleration is achieved. The design of lower level
controller is a complex problem because we not only need to make many assump-
tions on the mechanic system of engine transmission and drive-train, but also need
to consider the effect on tire and road condition. We also need to be aware of the
mechanical latency between the upper and lower level controllers. There exist a lot
of literature about the design and analysis of lower level controllers (Rajamani et al.,
2000). Here we mainly focuses on the upper-level control, so we assume that a lower
level controller is readily built and usable with constant mechanical latency.
2.2.3 Assumptions
In order to solve the vehicle platoon control problem, the following assumptions
are made.
1. Full automation.
In terms of level of automation, there are three major types of systems:
(a) Emergency warning system that alerts the driver when incidents happen
upstream.
(b) Semi-autonomous cruise control system that can take over certain parts or
all of vehicle control, but does not coordinate with other vehicles.
(c) Fully automatic control that can fully control the vehicles when in the
highway. This system will coordinate with other vehicle to maintain a safe
distance, and provide steering control to stay within a lane.
It was argued in (Varaiya, 1993) that although a partially automated system
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may improve safety, only full automation can achieve significant capacities in-
creases. Therefore, we assume that all vehicles are fully controlled by computers.
2. Identical Vehicles.
To simplify the description of model, we assume that all vehicles within a pla-
toon are identical. However, as is shown in the following section, this assump-
tion can be relaxed by simply replacing a constraint (2.7) in the optimization
problem to allow the modeling of different types of cars in the platoon.
3. Decentralized Control.
Each vehicle has its own controller. In each time step, each car made its own
decision on acceleration and steering control. There is no central controller
telling each vehicle what to do. However, while making individual decisions,
each vehicle still tries to coordinate its actions with neighboring cars.
The benefit of decentralized control is two-fold: first it requires less communi-
cation capacity than centralized control, thus reducing the likelihood of channel
congestion. Secondly, the decentralized system is more robust than a central-
ized system because the overall safety of a platoon is not compromised if one
or more controllers fail.
4. Vehicle Spacing Policy
Each vehicle is required to keep a safe distance from its preceding vehicle. There
are many spacing policies we can choose from (Zhang et al., 1999). Among them
the constant spacing and constant time headway spacing are frequently used
for platoon control. Constant spacing refers to the policy of keeping a constant
distance between consecutive vehicles no matter how fast they are traveling.
While this policy can achieve very high highway capacity, it may also lead to
higher risks of collision when emergency braking occurs.
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The spacing policy used in this project is constant time headway policy, which
tries to keep the ratio of vehicles spacing and velocity a constant. This policy
has been shown in (Liu et al., 2006) to providing a high level of safety.
5. Leading Car Control.
The platoon control scheme does not include leading car control. We assume
that the motion of leading car is exogenous to the model, either controlled by
a human driver or an automatic guidance system.
6. Wireless Communication.
Each vehicle is equipped with IEEE 802.11p (DSRC) transceiver and sends out a
message containing its position, speed and acceleration (often known as “Here I
am” message). We further assume the following for the communication system:
(a) For each car, messages are sent every Ks time steps from time 0.
(b) After each message is sent, it takes τ0 seconds for encoding and decoding
the message.
(c) When one message is sent, it is received by its designated receiver indepen-
dently with probability 1−ρ, where ρ is the message loss rate. We assume
this rate ρ is a constant for all sender-receiver pairs and for all time.
2.3 Description of Control Method
2.3.1 Problem Analysis
2.3.1.1 Centralized Control With No Latency
Firstly if we have a platoon of N vehicles, and a centralized controller that has
perfect real-time information about every vehicle, we will have the following basic
state-space model for (global) control:
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Ẋ = AX +BU
where X = [x1, . . . , xN , ẋ1, . . . , ˙xN ]
T , U = [ẍ1, . . . , ẍN ]
T , and xi is the position of
the ith car, A and B are matrix of appropriate size.
This model will work properly if we assume every vehicle can send its information
(position, velocity, etc.) to the central controller without any delay. However, in
a real world scenario, there is a delay in sending and receiving messages through
wireless channel. And usually the delay is a random variable. It has been shown in
(Liu et al., 2001) that if the delay is not a constant, then the system is not guaranteed
to be stable. Moreover, as is discussed in the previous section, the centralized control
makes the whole platoon vulnerable to disruption of wireless communication or failure
of central controller. We now establish a decentralized control model to handle these
issues.
2.3.1.2 Decentralized Controller With Latency
We assume that every vehicle in the platoon has its own controller. In order to
make a control decision, each vehicle’s controller needs to know how other vehicles are
moving. So we assume every vehicle broadcasts its information to all other vehicles
(thus every vehicle also receives information from all other vehicles).
Because of the communication latency, each vehicle may not have the current
information about other vehicles, but most likely, has the information sent by other
vehicles a fraction of seconds ago. In order to properly handle these out-dated infor-
mation, we will use a prediction model together with an optimization algorithm, also
known as Model-Predictive Control (MPC) method in the next sub-section.
Figure (2.1) illustrates the overview of communication and control scheme of a
11
Figure 2.1: Illustration of Communication and Control Scheme
three-vehicle platoon.
2.3.2 MPC Method
The method to be used in controlling vehicles is Model Predictive Control (MPC).
MPC has been applied in process industry and other many other control applications
(Maciejowski , 2002) (Camacho and Bordons , 1995), and was implemented for con-
trolling lane allocation of intelligent vehicles (Baskar et al., 2008).
MPC is based on a prediction model and an online optimization to obtain an
optimal control actions for the system. Firstly we discretize time horizon and set
the sampling period to T . At each time step k, the controller measures the current
state of the system, and use a predictive model to predict the system states in the
future, i.e., from time step k+ 1 to k+Kp, where Kp is the prediction horizon. Then
the predictive future states are used as parameters of an optimization problem that
minimizes some objective function J(k) over the decision variables u(k), . . . , u(k+Kp),
where u(k), . . . , u(k+Kp) are control variables. The general process of MPC is shown
in Figure 2.2 (also in paper (Baskar et al., 2008)).
In the following sub-sections, we will discuss these components of MPC methods
in details.
12
Figure 2.2: Illustration of MPC Control Scheme
2.3.3 Discretization of Time
Usually platoon controlling models are continuous in time (Rajamani et al., 2000).
However, we chose the discretized-time model over continuous-time model for the
following reasons: (1) discretized model is easier to fit in prediction and optimization
algorithm (2) to coincide with the discretized nature of computerized automated
control.
Now we discretize the time horizon into time intervals of length T seconds (i.e.,
sampling period is T ), and apply the control action u(k) when time t = kT, k =
0, 1, . . . , Kp, and hold constant within time period [k, k+ 1). This can be seen in the
lower part of Figure (2.2).
Similarly, we assume that messages are sent and received only at time t = kT, k =
0, 1, . . .. This assumptions holds true in practical applications: normally communi-
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cation devices have “buffers” that can hold messages sent or received during time
((k − 1)T, kT ), and deliver it to the sender or receiver at time kT .
Note that sampling period T can be adjusted according to the needs of different
applications. For instance, in the simulation experiments in the following sections, we
have chosen T = 0.05 after considering the trade-off between accuracy and simulation
speed.
2.3.4 Prediction Model to Handle Latency
We now define a set of variables which define the vehicle movement in discrete
time: let xi(k), vi(k) and ai(k) be respectively the position, speed and acceleration
of the ith vehicle at time kT .
As is discussed before, each car i at time kT sends xi(k), vi(k) and ai(k) to all
the other cars in the platoon. But because of the stochastic nature of communication
latency, these information arrives at destination car j at time kT with delay τi,j(k)
time steps, where j = 1, . . . , N . Therefore, at any given time kT , car j has information
from different cars with different “ages”. Figure 2.3 demonstrates this asynchronous
information transmission: white boxes represent information that is received by car 2,
whereas grey boxes represent information not known to car 2. In this case, τ1,2(k) = 3,
τ3,2(k) = 2 and τ4,2(k) = 3.
To handle this asynchronous information transmission, we assume every vehicle
has a buffer that can hold received information up to τmax + 3 time steps ago, where
τmax is the maximum delay counted in time steps. Now we can use this historic
information about other cars and a statistical model to “fill in the gaps” created by
latency. An effective statistical prediction model can predict how the other cars are
moving at the current time step, based on the historical information stored in the
buffer.
The statistical model we use to predict the movement of cars in this chapter
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is ARMAX(3,2,1) (Auto Regressive and Moving Average with eXogenous) model.
ARMAX model is a regression model that incorporate past observation of data as
well as estimation errors to predict future data series. For example if a vehicle j at
time step k wants to know what vehicle i’s speed is at the current time step, but it
only has speed of car i from period k − τmax − 3 to period k − τi,j(k), we can use the
following equation to estimate the speed of vehicles i during period [k− τi,j(k)+1, k]:
v̂i,j(κ) =φ1v̂i,j(κ− 1) + φ2v̂i,j(κ− 2) + φ3v̂i,j(κ− 3)
+ εi(κ)− θ1εi(κ− 1)− θ2εi(κ− 2)
+ η1âi,j(κ− 1) κ = k − τi,j(k) + 1, . . . , k (2.1)
where v̂i,j(κ) is the estimated speed of car i using car j’s information at time κ, and
âi,j is the estimated acceleration of car i at time κ. εi(k) is the estimation error of
car i at time t, and the coefficients φ, ε and η are estimated from data in the buffer:
vi(k − τmax − 3), . . . , vi(k − τi,j(k)), using least-square estimate.
Using estimated speed, we can get the estimated positions of all the other cars.
These estimation are fed into the optimization problem P (j, k) described below, which
is then solved for optimal acceleration of car j at time step k.
2.3.5 Optimization Problem
Under the MPC framework, after we have an estimated speed and position of
other cars, the controller of car j will construct an optimization problem to compute
the optimal actions for the next Kp time periods. The optimization problem consists
of an objective function J(k) indicating the goal we want to achieve during this time
period, and a group of constraints, which guarantee that the system is working in a
specified manner and within certain conditions.
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By minimizing this objective function, one can minimize the amount of accelera-
tion (or deceleration) in the following Kp time steps. However, in order to maintain













where H is the desired time headway (time used to travel the distance between two
consecutive cars at current speed), W is the penalty coefficient of deviating from the
desired headway. The second term in the objective function penalizes actions that
will bring two consecutive vehicles too close or too far away from each other, thus
tries to maintain a stable platoon system.
With the objective function (2.2), we define the optimization problem P (j, κ) for
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car j, j = 1, . . . , N at time step κ as follows:













s.t. xi(k + 1) = vi(k)T + xi(k) for i = 2, . . . , N, k = κ, . . . , κ+Kp
(2.5)
vi(k + 1) = ai(k)T + vi(k) for i = 2, . . . , N, k = κ, . . . , κ+Kp
(2.6)
amin ≤ ai(k + 1) ≤ amax for i = 2, . . . , N, k = κ, . . . , κ+Kp
(2.7)
Lvi(k) ≤ xi(k + 1) ≤ Uvi(k) for i = 2, . . . , N, k = κ, . . . , κ+Kp
(2.8)
x1(k) = x̂1(k) for k = κ, . . . , κ+Kp (2.9)
v1(k) = v̂1(k) for k = κ, . . . , κ+Kp (2.10)
xi(κ) = x̂i(κ) for i = 2, . . . , N (2.11)
vi(κ) = v̂i(κ) for i = 2, . . . , N (2.12)
where amin and amax are the minimum and maximum acceleration, respectively. Con-
straint (2.7) guarantees the maximum acceleration and deceleration will not exceed
the car’s mechanical limits. For the convenience of demonstration, we set all cars
have the same maximum acceleration, but one can easily change the value of these
two parameters to apply the model to non-identical vehicle platoon.
The constraints (2.5) and (2.6) keep track of the movement of every vehicle in
time and space appropriately. Constraints (2.9) to (2.12) are initial conditions of the
model, the right-hand-side of which comes from the prediction results of the ARMAX
model in the previous section.
Since this problem has linear constraints and quadratic objective function, it is a
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quadratic programming (QP) problem. Now we prove this is a convex programming
problem.
Theorem II.1. The objective function (2.4) is a convex function on X
Proof. To see that the objective function is convex, note that Jκ(X) can be expressed
as XTQX. Q is a positive semi-definite matrix because it can be expressed as sum of
squares of variables. So the objective function is convex.
Since the objective function is convex and all the constraints are linear, the op-
timization problem is a convex programming problem, thus can be solved efficiently
by QP solver.
2.3.6 Overview of Platoon Control Using MPC
The overview of the control algorithm on car 2 is shown in Figure (2.3).
Figure 2.3: Illustration of Decisions made by Car 2 at Time Step k
In the illustration, we assume the platoon has only four cars. Each box in the
grid represent the state of one vehicle at certain time step. Vehicle state contains the
position, velocity and acceleration. The white boxes represent information already
known to car 2, while the grey boxes represent information not known to car 2 due
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to communication latency. As in the illustration, car 2 knows every movement of
itself up to time step k, but only has car 1 and 4’s information up to time k− 3. The
black boxes represent predicted vehicle movement in the future, which is generated by
ARMAX model. These predicted information will be used as the parameters of QP
model P (j, κ) described earlier. Then the QP solver will give the optimal acceleration
at time k + 1 for car 2.
2.4 Analysis of Robustness of Control Method
Since we use ARMAX model to predict future states of vehicles, it will inevitably
introduce prediction errors into the MPC model. To test whether the MPC method
is reliable enough, one needs to test how the prediction error affects subsequent opti-
mization problem solutions. Here we use sensitivity analysis method on optimization
problem P (j, κ) and investigate how the optimal solution changes as the prediction of
speed and position change. The goal of this analysis is two-fold: 1) to test under what
conditions, the solutions can be used to maintain a stable system, 2) how large the
estimation error can be tolerated by the optimization problem without jeopardizing
the safety of the platoon.
2.4.1 General Form of QP
In order to achieve these goals, we can start from a general general form of




a = (a1(k), . . . , a1(k +Kp), . . . , aN(k), . . . , aN(k +Kp))
T
v = (v1(k), . . . , v1(k +Kp), . . . , vN(k), . . . , vN(k +Kp))
T
x = (x1(k), . . . , x1(k +Kp), . . . , xN(k), . . . , xN(k +Kp))
T
Then we re-formulate the QP problem P (j, κ) defined in (2.4)-(2.12) as follows:
minimize yTQy (2.13)
s.t. Ay = b (2.14)
By ≤ c (2.15)
where A and b are the coefficient matrix of the left-hand-side and right-hand-side
of equalities constraint (2.6),(2.5), and (2.9)-(2.12), respectively. B and c are the
coefficient matrix of the left-hand-side and right-hand-side of inequalities constraint
(2.7)-(2.8), respectively.
2.4.2 Sensitivity Function
Then we apply a small perturbation ε to the right-hand-side of equalities con-
straints, and define the sensitivity function y(ε) as follows:
ȳ(ε)= argminy y
TQy (2.16)
s.t. Ay = b+ ε (2.17)
By ≤ c (2.18)
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Here the estimation error ε is defined as
ε = (x̂1(κ), . . . , x̂1(κ+Kp), v̂1(κ), . . . , v̂1(κ+Kp), x̂2(κ), . . . , x̂N(κ), v̂2(κ), . . . , v̂N(κ))
T
The goal is to derive the parametric function ∆y(ε):
∆y(ε) = ȳ(ε)− ȳ(0) (2.19)
2.4.3 Boundary-state Analysis
To facilitate our analysis, we start with the following definition:
Definition II.2. We define the system (2.6) - (2.12) at any given time k is in a






Then we make the following assumption:
Claim II.3. When the system is not in boundary state, there exists a small enough
perturbation ε, such that the system at the next time step is still not in boundary
state.
By making this assumption, we can thus assume all of the inequalities (2.7) - (2.8)
are strict inequalities under small perturbation ε. Now we derive the KKT conditions,
which are a system of linear equations:
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Q(y + ∆y) + AT (µ+ ∆µ) = 0
A(ȳ + ∆y) = b+ ε




























where QB is the columns and rows of Q that are not all zeros, and ∆yB are corre-
sponding rows in ∆y. We can show that QB is a non-singular matrix. Thus we have





AB∆yB + AN∆yN − ε = 0
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Thus equation (2.20) reveals the linear relation between the error of estimation
and deviation from optimal control actions. Thus it indicates how control decision
ai(k), i = 2, . . . , N is affected by the error of ARMAX model. For any given time, if
we have an upper bound and lower bound on estimation error ε, we can numerically
compute how large the control error can be in each time step.
2.5 Simulation Tests
In order to test whether this MPC method can effectively work under harsh com-
munication environment, we set up a simulation test-bed to test the performance of
this algorithm in two different scenarios. We first describe the test-bed setup and
some implementation details, then present the results of two test scenarios.
2.5.1 Simulation Setup
2.5.1.1 Data Structure
The simulation test-bed and the control algorithm are implemented in MATLAB.
We use three vectors of size N to respectively represent vehicle positions, velocities
and accelerations. These vectors combined can be considered as the global system
state. On the other hand, each vehicle is programmed as a separate object in the
simulation. Each individual object has different “perceptions” of the system state
due to different communication latency. Also as is described in the previous sections,




Since we assume that each message being sent has an independent loss ratio ρ, we
can generate communication latency from vehicle i to j at time kT in the following
way:




where n is the number of times a message being sent (or re-sent), and is a geometric
distributed random variable with success rate (1− ρ). Because every message is sent
only at time step that is a multiple of Ks, thus the term k −Ksb kKs c indicates how
long since last time a message was sent (or re-sent).
2.5.1.3 Simulation Initialization
At the beginning of simulation, we initialize the program by setting the system at
“stable state”. So we let every vehicle driving at speed of 30 meters per second (67
mph), and at a distance of 30 meters (98 feet) apart. During the first τmax periods,
we does not apply any acceleration to vehicles, thus let vehicles running at a constant
speed. The reason for this initialization is to fill up the message buffer before enabling
the ARMAX prediction model to work. After τmax time steps, we apply a series of
acceleration and deceleration to the leading car, and record how the other cars react.
In the following two sub-sections, we test the MPC method under two scenarios:
first in a good communication environment, then a harsh environment. In both cases,
we use the same set of acceleration commands for the leading car
Table (2.1) is a brief description of parameter settings and their meanings in the
model.
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Table 2.1: Parameter Values
Parameter and Value Meaning
T = 0.05 sec. sampling interval (length of time step)
N = 4 number of vehicles in one platoon
Kp = 10 number of time steps we consider when solving QP problem
τmax = 50 maximum delay in wireless communication
W = 200 penalty coefficient
H = 1 sec. desired time headway
L = 0.5 sec. minimum time headway
U = 1.5 sec. maximum time headway
amin = −12m/s2 minimum acceleration
amax = 8m/s
2 maximum acceleration
τ0 = 1 message encoding & decoding delay counted in time steps
Ks = 2 or 6 message sent interval
ρ = 10% or 25% probability that a message is loss during transmission
2.5.2 Scenario One - Low Latency Wireless Communication
The first test scenario is to simulate vehicles driving at a “normal” state, with
only a few disruptions in wireless channel. Therefore we set Ks = 2, meaning that
messages are sent every 0.1 seconds. Message loss rate is set at ρ = 0.1, which
means 10% of the messages are loss during one transmission. Figure 2.4a shows the
acceleration of vehicles in the platoon. Note that acceleration of vehicle one is not
controlled by the MPC controller, but by pre-specified program input.
Figure 2.4c shows the average latency vehicles experienced along time. Notice
that even most of the time latency is at 0.1 seconds, it will occasionally spike to
0.3 seconds. Despite these latency, the effect of sudden braking and accelerating of
vehicle one is dampened when it propagates towards the end of platoon. Also Figure
2.4b and 2.4d demonstrate the speed and spacing between vehicles.
2.5.3 Scenario Two - High Latency Wireless Communication
The second test scenario is to test whether the MPC method can withstand noisy
wireless communication. Therefore we set Ks = 6, meaning that messages are sent
every 0.3 seconds. Message loss rate increases to ρ = 0.25, meaning that there are
25


































(a) Acceleration Profile of Scenario One




























(b) Speed Profile of Scenario One

































(c) Latency Profile of Scenario One




























(d) Spacing Profile of Scenario One
Figure 2.4: Scenario One
25% of chance that a message is loss during transmission. Figure 2.5a shows the
acceleration of vehicles in the platoon. Note that acceleration of vehicle one is not
controlled by the MPC controller, but is by a program input.
Figure 2.5c shows the average latency vehicles experienced along time. Notice in
this case, communication latency is significantly higher compared to the first case:
most of the latency numbers are between 0.1 to 0.3 seconds, while sometimes it takes
more than 0.9 seconds for a message to reach its destination. Although this is very
unlikely to happen in a real world application as is shown in experiments by (Bai and
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Krishnan, 2006), it does provide a worst case scenario for us to test the robustness
of MPC method.
The result indicates large latency does affect the quality of control decisions of
vehicle 2: there exists some jiggles in acceleration graph of car 2 and car 3 when
the communication latency are high. However, even in these extreme high level of
latency, the MPC algorithm still works properly, and operate every vehicle safely.


































(a) Acceleration Profile of Scenario Two




























(b) Speed Profile of Scenario Two



































(c) Latency Profile of Scenario Two




























(d) Spacing Profile of Scenario Two
Figure 2.5: Scenario One
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2.6 Conclusion and Future Work
We have proposed a decentralized control method for controlling a platoon of
vehicles under high-latency communication environment. We use MPC approach
which combines a statistical prediction model with an optimization algorithm and
give optimal control action for each time step. We also analyze the robustness of this
method using sensitivity analysis methods. Simulation experiments are performed
to test the effectiveness and safety of this control method. It has shown that the
MPC controller can react quickly to sudden braking or accelerating of leading car,
and dampen the effect of these actions as it propagates along the platoon. The
simulation also demonstrates the potential of this method to operate vehicles safely
in high-latency communication environment.
Future research includes more extensive case studies to test controller performance
under different parameters settings. Quantitative measurement of the performance
of the control method (i.e.,fuel efficiency, safety, ride quality) are needed to compare
this model to other existing platoon control schemes. Another research topic is to
reduce the size and complexity of optimization problem so that it can be computed
efficiently in inexpensive on-board computers.
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CHAPTER III
Using Combinatorial Auction and V2I
Communication to Allocate Traffic
3.1 Introduction
Traffic congestion is a major problem in many parts of the world. For example,
in the United States, the cost of increased travel times and fuel consumption alone is
estimated to amount to hundreds of dollars per capita per year (Schrank and Lomax ,
1999).
Many methods have been proposed for reducing congestion. A commonly studied
and implemented method is that of congestion pricing or tolling. A vehicle travelling
on a road increases the congestion and thus increases costs on other vehicles, leading
to increased social costs. However, in the absence of tolls there is no incentive for
individuals to consider the effect of their actions on the system. Tolling, on the
other hand, is a price mechanism that shifts the social cost of travelling to individual
vehicles, thus makes the traffic system more efficient. The idea of congestion pricing
was recognized and advocated by (Pigou, 1912), and later promoted by William
Vickrey’s influential work (Vickrey , 1969).
As is stated in Vickrey’s work, effective congestion pricing requires that tolls be
set according to the severity of congestion. This then requires that tolls be a function
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of the time, location, type of vehicle, etc. Many scholars have proposed a variety of
dynamic congestion pricing schemes. For example, Friesz et. al. present a sophis-
ticated method (Friesz et al., 2007) for dynamic congestion pricing. Even though,
unfortunately most of these are computationally intensive and difficult to implement,
some of them have been successful in the real world. As an example, in Singapore
(Toh and Phang , 1997). (Lindsey and Verhoef , 2000) provides a good review of these
pricing models under various settings, like pricing in network, heterogeneity of users,
stochastic congestion and so on.
Another proposed methodology for relieving traffic congestion is the use of auc-
tions. (Teodorović et al., 2008) propose an auction-based congestion pricing scheme,
which lets participating vehicles bid for time-slots for travel in the down-town area of
a city. However, the auction is only used for controlling overall flow in an area, and
does not allocate traffic at the network level.
Emerging technology such as Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication en-
ables direct information exchange between vehicles and traffic controllers. Milanés
et. al. propose an approach that uses Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication
(Milanés et al., 2012) to manage traffic. In this chapter, we propose a congestion con-
trol method based on a combinatorial auction implemented with V2I devices. The
auction system determines the toll price according to individual vehicle ‘bids’, which
are collected through a system of V2I devices.
This chapter is organized as follows: a detailed description of the mathematical
model and the auction scheme is presented in section 3.2. In section 3.5, we test
the auction in a small network with 5100 vehicles. In section 3.3 we analyze the
computational complexity of the problem. In Section 3.4, we discuss issues related to
the implementation of the auction in the real world.
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3.2 Combinatorial Auctions
The fundamental reason for congestion is that too many vehicles compete for
limited road resources. In economics, one efficient way to allocate scarce resources is
through an auction. In this section, we will describe the motivation and details of an
auction mechanism.
3.2.1 Introduction to Combinatorial Auctions
3.2.1.1 Background
Auctions have been used as a mechanism for exchanging goods or service since
early human history. In the basic types of auctions, buyers offer bids, while sellers
take bids, and then sell the item to the highest bidder. Auctions ask and answer the
most fundamental questions in economics: who should get the goods and at what
prices? In answering these questions, auction theory has been the most influential
and widely studied field in economics of the recent decades.
To understand the idea of combinatorial auctions, it is useful to first look at some
commonly used types of auctions. Open descending price auction, also known as
Dutch auction, in which auctioneer begins with a high asking price which is low-
ered until some participant is willing to accept the auctioneer’s price. The winning
participant pays the last announced price.
Open ascending-bid auction, or English auction, is widely used in selling antiques
and artwork, and recently used in online market, such as eBay. Participants bid
openly against one another, with each subsequent bid required to be higher than the
previous bid. The auction ends when no participant is willing to bid higher, at which
point the highest bidder pays their bid.
In both of the aforementioned auctions, multiple buyers are bidding for a single
item. The auction we use in here, however, requires multiple buyers (vehicles) bidding
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for multiple items (roads). This is called a combinatorial auction.
3.2.1.2 Basic Combinatorial Auctions
Combinatorial auctions allows bidders to bid not just for a particular item, but
for sets of items, sometimes called bundles.
A general case of combinatorial auction has the following settings (Bikhchandani
et al., 2002): Let N be the set of bidders, who are bidding for a set M of items. For
every set of objects S ⊆M , let bi(S) be the bid of agent i ∈ N on set S. Also denote
that xi(S) = 1 if the bundle S ⊆ M is assigned to i ∈ N and zero otherwise. Then












xi(S) ≤ 1 ∀j ∈M (3.2)
∑
S⊆M
xi(S) ≤ 1 ∀i ∈ N (3.3)
xi(S) = 0, 1 ∀S ⊆M, i ∈ N (3.4)
Constraint (3.2) ensures that overlapping sets of items are never assigned. Con-
straint (3.3) ensures that no bidder receives more than one subset of items. The
objective function maximize the total revenue of the seller by summing up values of
all combinations proposed by bidders.
As is seen in the optimization problem, the revenue of seller depends on the bids
submitted vi(S), but there is no guarantee that the submitted bids approximate the
actual values that bidders assign to the various subsets. Usually bidders have incentive
to lie about these values in order maximize their own benefit, if the mechanism to
prevent this is not present.
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With carefully designed payment scheme, one can induce all the bidders to bid
their true value. The most general class of such auction is characterized by Vickrey,
Clarke, and Groves (Vickrey , 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves , 1973). This is also known
as Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism. The basic ideas is that after items are
assigned to bidders, bidders are asked to pay the “opportunity cost” of winning the ,
rather than paying the bidding price. The details of computing payment is presented
in section 3.2.5.
Examples applications of combinatorial auctions are the FCC spectrum auctions
(Cramton, 1997), auctions for airport time slots (Rassenti et al., 1982), railroad seg-
ments (Brewer , 1999), delivery routes(Sheffi , 2004) and network routing (Hershberger
and Suri , 2001).
3.2.1.3 Using Combinatorial Auctions
In the context of using combinatorial auction to solve congestion problem, the
items are the set of links, whereas the bidders are vehicles (drivers) who want to use
these links. Usually vehicles travel through more than one link in a journey. Thus
they must submit bids for “bundles” of links, which corresponds to paths in the traffic
network.
Figure 3.1 illustrates an example of using combinatorial auction to allocate road
resource to three vehicles.
Table 3.1: Vehicles
Vehicles Origin Destination Bids
1 A D (AB,BD), (AB,BC,CD), (AC,CB,BD)
2 A C (AC), (AB, BC)
3 A B (AB), (AC, CB)
As is shown in table 3.1, vehicle 1 travels from A to D, thus needs to submit bids
for four paths (bundles): (AB, BD), (AB, BC, CD), (AC, CB, BD) (assuming that
we only consider simple paths, i.e., ignoring all paths that contain cycles). Similarly,
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Figure 3.1: Network of Links
for vehicle 2 and 3, they each need to submit 2 bids for their travel.
In this chapter, a Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communication system is used
implement a combinatorial auction designed to efficiently allocate road resources.
This V2I system enables a two-way communication between each vehicle and a central
controller: vehicles send their “bids” to the central controller, and then the central
controller sends back the path assignment and payment information to vehicles. V2I
devices can be pre-installed in vehicles, or more conveniently, run as a specifically
designed “apps” on smart-phones of drivers.
This auction is a type of VCG mechanism. In this mechanism, every vehicle
submits a bid to the traffic controller for each path it wants to travel. The traffic
controller assigns a path to each vehicle, and charges a certain price for taking the
path. The price is set in such a way that drivers have no incentive to mis-report their
truthful bid for each path. The outline of this mechanism is as follows:
3.2.2 Outline of the Auction Mechanism
The auction system is implemented on a subset of the links in a network. Each
vehicle using these links submit its “bids” (the prices s/he is willing to pay) to the
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central controller. The central controller collects these bids, and solves an optimiza-
tion problem to assign a path and the corresponding toll to each vehicle. Figure 3.2
illustrates this auction mechanism. On the left of the figure, is the network of links
The auction system works as follows:
1. Before travelling, each vehicle submits a “bid” to the traffic controller via V2I
communication. Each bid consists of the following information:
• Origin and destination of the travel
• Estimated time to enter the network
• Price s/he is willing to pay for each potential path s/he can travel.
2. After the submission deadline, traffic controller collects these bids, and uses
this information to solve an optimization problem (details discussed in section
3.2.5). The controller then sends back the following instructions to each vehicle:
• Path to take (path assignment)
• Toll to pay (payment)
3. At start of travel, the vehicle is automatically charged through electronic devices
installed in the car. Vehicles must take the assigned path. A penalty fee will
be charged for any deviation from the assigned path.
In the rest of this section, we will address the following questions about the auction
mechanism.
• What information must the drivers provide to the controller
• How does the controller determine who will be assigned to which path (path
assignment)
• What is the toll a driver pays for taking the path. This can be different from






Figure 3.2: Auction Mechanism
• Mechanism to guarantee drivers bid their true valuation
• Is the solution efficient
In this model, we require that ALL vehicles are equipped with V2I devices and
the required dedicated software to participate in the auction process. However, this
system can also be implemented as a sub-system embedded in a larger network. For
example, it can be used as the pricing model for a network of (High Occupancy
Vehicle) HOV or HOT (High Occupancy Toll) lanes. In these cases, the requirement
that every vehicle be equipped with V2I devices is not required. Details of this issue
will be discussed in the section 3.4.
3.2.3 Assumptions
We make the following assumptions:
• Infrastructure
1. Every vehicle is equipped with two-way V2I wireless devices (will be re-
laxed later)
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2. The bidding process and toll collection is done through wireless communi-
cation.
• Traffic Controller
1. No congestion (free flow) for all the links in the auction network
2. Controller has mechanism to prevent drivers from deviating from assigned
path (i.e., through penalty)
3. Vehicle must establish communication with controller before entering the
network
• Drivers and Vehicles
1. Every vehicle must submit bids for all of the paths it can potentially use
2. All vehicles travel at free flow speed in the network
3. Bids are calculated and submitted by on-board computers
4. Each driver’s cost function is independent of other drivers (private value)
5. Once assigned, the driver must accept the path and pay the toll
3.2.4 Mathematical Model
3.2.4.1 Network
Consider a network that consists of a set of L = {1, 2, . . . , L} of links. For each link
l ∈ L, the free-flow capacity and travel time are denoted as Cl and Tl, respectively.
A path is defined as a sequence of links from one origin to one destination. The set
of all possible paths is denoted by P = {1, 2, . . . , P}. We denote a path p ∈ P as a
sequence of links it contains:
p ≡ {ap(1), a
p




where |p| is the number of links contained in p, and ap(i) is the ith link in path p. And







There are N vehicles, denoted by set N = {1, 2, . . . , N}, using the traffic network.
Vehicle i ∈ N will enter the network at time Ai.
The traffic controller’s job is to assign a path to each vehicle. The path assignment




i , . . . , x
P
i ), where x
j
i = 1 means vehicle i is assigned






Each vehicle has a utility function Ui(xi) that maps a valid assignment xi to a
real number:
Ui(xi) : {0, 1}P → R
It can be interpreted as the benefit vehicle i gets when travelling under assignment
xi.
Although this utility function can be of any form, for the purpose of demonstrating







where vji is the value of travelling in path j, by vehicle i. Note that the actual bid,
v̂ji , made by vehicle i for path j, may be different from the true value v
j
i .
1T p does not change as no congestion is allowed
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3.2.4.3 Time
The entire planning period is discretized into a set of intervals of equal length δ,
denoted as T = {1, 2, . . . , T}. δ is set small enough so that the travel time of any
link in the network is an integer multiple of δ, but not too small so as to make the
problem computationally difficult (issues of computation will be discussed in section
3.3 ).
The typical planning period δT can be set to 24 hours, or to the duration of the
peak hours when congestion is likely to happen.
3.2.5 Optimization Problem
Given a path assignment matrix for all drivers, x = (x1, x2, . . . , xN), and the bids
v̂ji for vehicle i and path j, we evaluate the system performance using the sum of the













Assuming that all links are congestion free, we define the following delay operator








in other words, τ jl is the time to travel to the entrance of link l, given that the
vehicle is on path j.
39
Based on the above social utility function and delay operator τ jl , we formulate the


















xji ≤ Cl ∀t ∈ T, l ∈ L (3.6)
xji = 0, 1 ∀i ∈ N, j ∈ P (3.7)
Constraint (3.5) ensures that each vehicle is assigned to exactly one path. Con-
straint (3.6) enforce the number of vehicles in each link l at each time period t does
not exceed the total capacity of the link. This is done by summing up all the vehicles
that have entered, but not yet exited link l at time t. t− τ jl − Tl is the time a vehicle
arrives at the entrance of path j (also the entrance of network), given that it reaches
the entrance of link l at time t. On the other hand, t − τ jl is the time a vehicle
arrives at the entrance of path j, given that it reaches the exit of link l at time t.
Constraint (3.7) ensures that the assignment variable xji can only be zero or one.
On solving (MAX 1), we obtain an optimal assignment that maximizes the social
utility function. This assignment is then distributed to individual vehicles via V2I
wireless communication devices, informing them of the path to take.
3.2.6 Payment
The optimization problem (MAX 1), generates an optimal solution x∗, deter-
mining the path assigned to each vehicle. We now determine the toll price for this
assignment. We adopt a scheme similar to traditional VCG mechanism, which deter-
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mines the toll as an “opportunity cost” it imposes on other vehicles, in other words,











where x−k = (x1, . . . , xk−1, xk+1, . . . , xN). U−k is the utility when vehicle k has been
excluded.
We modify the optimization problem (MAX 1) to exclude vehicle k, and call it




















xji ≤ Cl ∀t ∈ T, l ∈ L (3.9)
xji = 0, 1 ∀i ∈ N, i 6= k, j ∈ P (3.10)
Thus U∗−k is the optimal social utility when vehicle k is not in the system.
If we denote x∗−k as the optimal solution from (MAX 1), excluding vehicle k, then




The first term in equation (3.11), is the optimal social utility without vehicle
k, and the second term is the social utility of the optimal solution x∗ of (MAX 1),
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without the vehicle k. The difference of these two terms is the increase in social utility
when vehicle k is not included in the system, justifying it as a toll for vehicle k.
Note that the first term depends only on the bids of vehicles other than k. This is
the desirable feature of VCG mechanism, which generates no incentive for vehicles to
mis-report their true value (in other words, this mechanism guarantees vji = v̂
j
i ∀i ∈
N, j ∈ P).
Theorem III.1. Truthful reporting is an optimal strategy for each vehicle driver in
the auction mechanism. Moreover, when each vehicle driver reports truthfully, the
outcome of the mechanism is one that maximizes social utility.
The proof of Theorem III.1 is in Appendix A.1.
3.3 Computational Issues
Both the path assignment problem (MAX 1) and payment problems (MAX 1-k)
are Integer Programming (IP) problems, and thus NP-complete. These are also noto-
riously hard to solve for large problem size. Although medium-size problems like the
example we used in section 3.5 can be solved relatively fast, it could take considerably
longer to solve larger size problems with more vehicles and larger network. In this
section, we will analyze the structure of these problems and propose some methods
to reduce the complexity of computation.
3.3.1 Solving Path Assignment Problem
The constraint (3.7) of path assignment problem (MAX 1) requires that all vari-
ables be integer, this makes the problem an IP. A typical way of solving IP is to first
solve Linear Programming (LP) relaxation of the IP problem and then use branch-
and-bound method to find the optimal integer solution.
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3.3.1.1 Structure of The Path Assignment Problem
Consider the constraints of the LP relaxation of (MAX 1).
∑
j∈P






xji + st,l = Cl ∀t ∈ T, l ∈ L (3.13)
xji ≥ 0 ∀i ∈ N, i 6= k, j ∈ P (3.14)
where st,l,∀t ∈ T, l ∈ L are the “slack” variables of each capacity constraint, which
represents how many unit of capacity of link l is unused at time t.
This problem has N ×P variables. There are N constraints in the first constraint
group (3.12) and T × L constraints in the second constraint group (3.13). In the
context of a Simplex method, a basis consists of N + TL basic variables.
Based on the special structure of the basis, we can prove the following theorem:
Theorem III.2. Solving the relaxed IP, the number of non-integer variables in any
basic solution is bounded by 2TL. Moreover, if no links are capacitated, the solution
of LP relaxation of the problem is integer.
Proof. Since for each vehicle i, a constraint in group (3.12) can provide at least one
basic variable.
On the other hand, each constraint in group (3.13) must provide at least one basic
variable.
If none of the links are capacitated, all of the TL slack variables st,l should be
positive, which make them basic variables. The coefficients of these slack variables
(all equal to one) form a TL × TL identity matrix in the basis. In this case, each
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constraint i in group (3.12)
∑
j∈P
xji = 1 (3.15)
must provide one, and only one basic variable, thus this constraint group provides an











where IN is a N × N identity matrix, and ITL is a TL × TL identity matrix. The
upper part of the matrix corresponds to constraints in group (3.12), while the lower
part of the matrix corresponds to constraints in group (3.13). In this case, since the
entire basis is a identity matrix, the optimal solution to the LP relaxation is always
integer.
If there are n links at capacity, slack variables corresponding to those links are
non-basic, thus there are n more xji as basic variables. These additional x
j
i will make
some of the constraints in (3.12) contain more than one basic variable. In the worst
case, the structure of the basis is
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
IN−n 0 0 0
0 In Q 0
R1 R2 R3 0















where R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, R6, Q are matrices containing only zero and one as elements.
Thus, in the worst case, there will be at most 2n basic variables in matrix Q, thus
give 2n non-integer solutions.
If all of the TL links are at capacity, there will be at most 2TL non-integer
variables in the LP relaxation of (MAX 1).
In general, the proportion of non-integer variables is 2TL/NP . In large network,
T  N and L P , so only a small percentage of variables will be non-integer. In the
test case of section 3.5, (60× 4)/(5100× 4) = 1.18% of variables will be non-integer
at most.
3.3.1.2 Reducing Complexity
One method to reduce complexity of (MAX 1) is to use a smaller number of
potential paths for each vehicle, and instead of letting vehicles choose from all of the
available paths, we limit their choice to, say, at most six paths.
3.3.2 Solving Payment Problem
Although the initial path assignment problem (MAX 1) may itself be hard to solve,
a bigger computational challenge is in solvingN instances of payment problems (MAX
1-k).
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Now we present two methods to reduce the computation time of solving payment
problems:
1. Using approximate solution for payment problem.
As is shown in (Nisan and Ronen, 2000), in order to maintain truthful reporting
property of VCG mechanism, (MAX 1) must be solved to optimality, but the
solution of (MAX 1-k) need not be optimum. So in order to reduce solving time
for payment problems, we can set an optimality gap, say, 2%, when solving
the payment problems. The branch-and-bound algorithm will stop when the
obtained solution is at most 2% away from actual optimal solution. In this
case, vehicles will pay less than what VCG mechanism will prescribe.
2. Solve payment problem only once for vehicles assigned to the same path at the
same time.
In our computation experiment, it is observed that if two vehicles enter the
network at the same time and are assigned the same path, they pay the same
toll. We have not yet proven this, so we propose this as a conjecture:
Conjecture III.3. If two vehicles arrive at the same entrance at the same time,
and are assigned the same path, they will be charged the same amount.
However, a weaker theorem (III.4) can be proved. Intuitively, this theorem
indicates that “rich” drivers will always pay no less than “poor” drivers :
Theorem III.4. If two vehicles k1 and k2 that
(a) share the same origin and destination,
(b) arrive at the entrance of their trip at the same time
(c) were assigned to the same path by the traffic controller
(d) for vehicle k = k1, k2, v
1
k ≤ v2k ≤ · · · ≤ vPk is always true
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(e) the value of paths by two vehicles satisfies vj1k1 − v
j2
k1




j1, j2 ∈ P
then vehicle k1 would pay no more than k2
Proof. Consider two vehicles k1 and k2 which share the same arrival time Ak1 =
Ak2 .
Suppose these two vehicles were assigned the same path j∗, then the payment
























Now if we let j2 be the path assigned to vehicle k2 in (MAX 1-k1), that is, j2
satisfies xj2k2 = 1 in the optimal solution of (MAX 1-k1). And similarly, let j1
satisfy xj1k1 = 1 in the optimal solution of (MAX 1-k1). We claim that
j∗ ≤ j1 ≤ j2 (3.16)
To prove this, use contradiction. If j1 > j2, then we can do one of the following




instead of xj2k2 = 1
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instead of xj1k1 = 1
Define U−k1,k2 as the social utility excluding both vehicle k1 and k2. Also
denote x−k2)
∗
−k1 as the optimal solution to (MAX 1-k2), removing vehicle k1,
while x−k1)
∗
−k2 as the optimal solution to (MAX 1-k1), removing vehicle k2.
Note that payment problem (MAX 1-k1) and (MAX 1-k2) have identical feasible
region (if we treat variables xjk1 as x
j
k2
and vice versa). The only difference


























+ vj1k2 − v
j2
k2



































This means at least one of ∆U−k1 or ∆U−k2 must be positive. So it is always
possible to improve either U∗−k1 or U
∗
−k2 , which contradict with the assumption
that they are optimal.
If the conjecture is true, it can be used to reduce running time of our mechanism:
instead of solving payment problem for each vehicle, we solve payment problem
(MAX 1-k) only once for each time step and each path.
3.4 Implementation Issues
3.4.1 Alternative Free Paths
We have assumed that every vehicle participating in the auction will be assigned
to exactly one non-congested path. However, in most applications, this might be a
too restricted, which can make problem (MAX 1) infeasible.
One extension of this auction model is to allocate at least one alternative free
path between any pair of origin and destination. This alternative path, unlike other
paths in the model, is toll-free, but is subject to congestion. We set Pf as the set of




i ∀p ∈ Pf , j /∈ Pf
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The rest of the auction mechanism remains the same, except that if a vehicle is
assigned to a free path in problem (MAX 1), no payment problem (MAX 1-k) is
solved, and the vehicle pays no toll.
3.4.2 Auction as a Tolling Sub-system for HOV or HOT Lanes
An issue that arises while implementing V2I devices, or generally, Intelligent
Transportation System (ITS), is that early users of the systems gain little or no
benefit when the market penetration of that device is low. Although the auction
mechanism we present here is implemented as a stand-alone system, where all vehi-
cles are required to be equipped with V2I devices, it can also be used as a tolling
sub-system for High Occupancy Vehicle (HOV) or High Occupancy Toll (HOT) lanes.
In this case, the set of links L is defined as the set of HOV or HOT lanes. Regular
lanes are treated as alternative links as in section 3.4.1. Only vehicles equipped
with bidding devices are allowed to enter the HOT lanes, while vehicles without V2I
devices can use regular lanes in the network. Thus, all vehicles can use the roads
regardless of whether they are equipped with V2I bidding devices. At the same time,
the system creates an incentive for vehicles to participate in the auction since then it
allows non-congested travel.
3.4.3 Rolling Horizon
The current auction is operated off-line, meaning that all vehicles bid and get the
assigned paths before starting travel. This limits the usability of the model. However,
one can extend this model to a rolling horizon reservation system. In this system,
we set up a main auction labelled B0 which has a “cut-off” time, say, two hours
before the start of planning period. Every vehicle that bids before this cut-off time
will receive the path assignment and payment information immediately at the cut-off
time. Vehicles who miss the cut-off time can still bid upon arrival at the entrance by
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Figure 3.3: Network
participating in the following “rolling” auction:
The traffic controller will start a new round of auction Bt at every time period
t ∈ T. Vehicles arriving between time t − 1 and t who did not bid before the cut-
off time can participate in auction Bt. In auction Bt, we solve problems (MAX
1) and (MAX 1-k) by replacing the right-hand-side of constraint (3.9) by Cl,t, the
“remaining capacity” of link l at time t. Cl,t is calculated by subtracting the number
of vehicles using link l at time t from the free-flow capacity Cl, using the prior vehicles’
assignments from B0, B1, . . . , Bt−1.
Since Cl,t is always less than Cl, vehicles bid in auction Bt are likely to pay higher
toll than those who bid in B0.
3.5 Numerical Experiment
3.5.1 Experiment One: One Origin-Destination Pair
We test this model on the traffic network shown in Figure 3.3.
There are six links in this network. The free flow travel time Tl of each link l is
shown in a box next to it. The free flow capacity Cl is also shown as a red number
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attached to link l.
We set up the number Tl such that four paths have different free flow travel
time: 8 for Path ABCD, 9 for ACD, 10 for ABD, and 13 for ACBD. This makes the
interaction of path choice and toll transparent.
To better understand the dynamic of traffic assignment and toll price, we assume
that all vehicles are travelling only from A to D.
We assume that the number of vehicles arriving at the entrance follows a Poisson
distribution with rate λ. Note that λ can be a function of time.
We assume vehicles’ value vji for travelling in path j is a linear function of the
free-flow travel time of path j, i.e., vji = ciT
j. Here ci can be viewed as the vehi-
cle i’s “willingness-to-pay” per unit travel time. We generate ci with a log-normal
distribution with mean µ = 1 and standard deviation σ = 0.5.
To simulate the situation of real traffic, we generate an incoming vehicle flow in
the following manner: from time 0 to 20, the number of vehicles arriving gradually
increases from 60 to 100 vehicles per minute. Then the rate of arrival stays at 100
vehicles per minute from time 20 to 40 before it gradually decreasing to 60 vehicles
per minute at time 60.
The parameters of this test are shown in Table 3.2
Table 3.2: Parameters of Simulation
Parameter Meaning
N = 5100 Total Number of Vehicles
δ = 1 Minutes per Time Period
T = 60 Number of Time Periods
λ Vehicle arrival rate
µ = 1 Mean of willingness-to-pay
σ = 0.5 Standard deviation of willingness-to-pay
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3.5.1.1 Results of Experiment One
We generate input data according to the settings described above, and solve the
path assignment (MAX 1) and payment problems (MAX 1-k) using CPLEX 12.0. A
30-CPU computer cluster was used to solve 5100 payment problems in parallel. It
took about 5 minutes to solve the path assignment and all payment problems.




















Figure 3.4: Number of Vehicles Using Each Path
As is shown in Figure 3.4, at the beginning when traffic is low, all of the traffic
goes through the shortest two paths: ABCD and ACD. As traffic flow increases over
time, more and more vehicles are assigned to longer paths.
At the same time, Figure 3.5 shows that the toll price also goes up as the traffic
flow increases over time. Also the toll is higher for shorter path, and lower for longer
path.
We also analyze the traffic flow of each link during the 60 minutes test period. As
is shown in Figure 3.6, while flow in link AC and BD only reach link capacity during


















Figure 3.5: Average Toll Price





















Figure 3.6: Number of Vehicles Using Each Link
To see if the mechanism distributes the toll “fairly”, we compare the relationship
between payment and bid of each vehicle in Figure 3.7, which consist of four sub-
figures, each representing one path. For each path j, we plot all vehicles assigned to
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this path in the following way: for vehicle k, arrival time Ak is plotted as x coordinate,
whereas payment per unit travel time (πk/Tj) is plotted as y coordinate, and the color
of a dot represents the value per unit travel time (ck), with red being lowest value,
and purple being the highest.
Since many vehicles share the same arrival time and payment, to clearly distin-
guish each vehicle, we add a small random perturbation to each vehicle’s x and y
coordinates. As is already shown in Figure 3.5, vehicles assigned to shorter paths
such as ABCD would pay more than vehicles assigned to longer paths such as ACBD.
More importantly, this figure shows that vehicles assigned to shorter paths are driven
by mostly “richer” people, i.e., people who has higher value of time ci: most of the
dots in the first sub-figure representing the shortest path ABCD are green and blue,
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Figure 3.7: Payment and Bid Relationship Over Time
We also group all vehicle who has the same ci together, and plot the distribution
of payments (tolls) for each group using ‘box-plot’ in Figure 3.8. The meaning of this
box-plot is as follows: the line within a box represents the median of payment within
a corresponding ci group. The upper and lower end of each box represent the first
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and third quartiles (25th and 75th percentiles) of payment in the group. The red line
above the box extends from the first quartile to the highest value that is within 1.5
times inter-quartile range, or distance between the first and third quartiles. Similarly,
the red line below the box ranges from the third quartile to the lowest value within
1.5 times inter-quartile. Payments not in these ranges (outliers) will be plotted as
black dots.
From Figure 3.8, we can see that all tolls per unit travel time are less than their
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Figure 3.8: Payment and Bid Relationship
3.5.2 Experiment Two
In the second experiment, we simulate our auction mechanism in a highway net-
work similar to the one near Los Angeles, CA. This area contains freeway I-5, I-405,
CA-22 , CA-91 and CA-55. In this test, we use 42 nodes and 98 links. The structure
of this network is shown in Figure 3.9.
Vehicles are generated to travel from 80 of the origin-destination (O-D) pairs, each


































Figure 3.9: Traffic Network Near Los Angeles
between each O-D pair.
Figure 3.10 shows the histogram of vehicles willingness-to-pay per unit time ci.
As the same in Experiment One, this parameter is also a log-normal distributed with
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Figure 3.10: Histogram of ci (Willingness-to-pay Per Unit Time)
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Table 3.3: Origin and Destination Pairs of The Experiment
Origin Destination Percentage Origin Destination Percentage
a f 0.543 y n 0.543
f a 0.543 n z 2.174
a j 0.543 z n 0.543
j a 0.543 n α 1.630
a h 0.543 α n 0.543
h a 0.543 n β 1.630
a g 1.087 β n 0.543
g a 1.087 n k 1.630
a r 1.087 k n 0.543
r a 1.087 n f 2.174
a u 1.087 f n 1.087
u a 1.087 f c 1.087
a y 0.543 c f 1.087
y a 0.543 f u 1.630
a z 0.543 u f 0.543
z a 0.543 f t 1.630
a x 1.087 t f 1.087
a α 1.087 f y 2.174
α a 1.087 y f 0.543
a β 1.630 f z 1.630
β a 1.630 z f 0.543
s f 0.543 j y 2.717
f s 0.543 j z 2.717
s c 0.543 j i 1.630
c s 0.543 j u 2.174
s α 1.087 j t 1.630
α s 1.087 d y 1.630
s β 1.087 d z 2.174
β s 1.087 d i 2.174
s g 1.630 d m 2.174
g s 0.543 d l 2.174
s i 1.630 e u 1.630
i s 1.087 e t 2.174
s x 1.630 e i 2.717
x s 0.543 e m 1.630
s v 1.087 e l 1.630
v s 0.543 b n 1.087
s w 1.087 b h 3.261
w s 0.543 b g 1.630
n y 1.630 b x 1.087
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Other parameters are similar as in experiment one, except that this time we test
12000 vehicles in a period of 120 minutes. List of these parameters are shown in table
3.4.
Table 3.4: Parameters of Simulation
Parameter Meaning
N = 12000 Total Number of Vehicles
δ = 1 Minutes per Time Period
T = 120 Number of Time Periods
λ Vehicle arrival rate
µ = 1 Mean of willingness-to-pay
σ = 0.5 Standard deviation of willingness-to-pay
3.5.2.1 Results of Experiment Two
We test the auction mechanism in the aforementioned settings. It takes 22 minutes
to solve the path assignment and all of the 12000 payment problems on a 30-CPU
cluster running CPLEX 12.0. Figure 3.11 shows the percentage of capacity used for
each link at different time during the test: flow in links that are more than 90% of
the capacity is colored in red, while flow between 80% and 90% of capacity is colored














































































































































Figure 3.11: Vehicle Flow in Network











































































































































































Figure 3.12: Flow of Vehicles of Various Origins and Destinations
Figure 3.13 shows the price that each vehicle paid for their assigned paths. Be-
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cause of the limit of space, we only show these prices between six pairs of origin and





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.13: Payment of Vehicles Travelling Between Six O-D Pairs
Notice that vehicles in certain paths such as in Figure 3.13a, 3.13c 3.13d and 3.13f
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are paying very high price, whereas vehicles in other paths such as in Figure 3.13b
and 3.13e almost pay nothing. We will analyze this abnormal pricing in the next
section.
3.5.3 Voluntary Participation Issues
As is seen in the result of experiment two, some vehicles are paying very high
price for the path assigned. In fact, some of them are even paying higher than what
they bid for the paths. In reality, vehicles having to pay more than they bid would
not even participate in the auction.
This abnormal payment happens when the model is used in a multiple Origin-
Destination (OD) pairs settings.
The reason for abnormal payment is illustrated in the following example shown in




Figure 3.14: Abnormal Payment Example
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Table 3.5: Paths and Bids of Abnormal Payment Example
(a) Paths Specification for Vehicles




(b) Vehicles Bids for Each Path




Every vehicle has two available paths to travel. The paths specification of each
vehicle and their individual bids are shown in table 3.5.
Suppose each link only has one unit of capacity. Also assume that vehicle A and
B arrives at node a at the same time, and vehicle A and C arrives at node b at the
same time. So the only two feasible assignments are:
A→ 1, B → 2, C → 2
or
A→ 2, B → 2, C → 1
It is easy to see that the optimal assignment is to assign vehicle A, B and C to
their path 1, 2 and 2 respectively. So the optimal social utility is
U∗ = 10 + 2 + 1 = 13
To calculate the payment of vehicle A, we “remove” it from the system, and calculate
the social utility U∗−A:
U∗−A = 8 + 7
Since now without vehicle A, both vehicle B and C can be assigned to their respective
“preferred” paths.
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= U∗−A − (U∗ − v1A)
= 15− (13− 10)
= 12 > 10 = v1A
As is seen in this example, the reason behind this phenomenon is that when
some vehicle is assigned to a “critical path” in the network, it essentially becomes a
bottleneck, forcing many other vehicles to be assigned to less desirable paths. And











where j∗ is the optimal path assigned to vehicle k. Usually the term U∗ −U∗−k
is positive, making the payment less than what k bid for the path, but when there
is significant bottleneck caused by k, as is demonstrated by the previous example,
U∗ −U∗−k becomes negative, leading to payment higher than the bid.
3.5.3.1 Using Alternative Path
The reason for the bottleneck to form is that we assume each vehicle is always
guaranteed one path. Sometimes this assigned path turns out to be a bottleneck for
many other vehicles.
One method to fix this problem is to assume that there is an alternative path
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between every origin and destination pairs. This alternative path is free of charge,
but could be congested. Call this free path f(i) for vehicle i. Since f(i) might be
congested, we further assume that the bid for this path v
f(i)
i = 0 ∀i ∈ N.

























xji ≤ Cl ∀t ∈ T, l ∈ L (3.18)
xji = 0, 1 ∀i ∈ N, j ∈ P (3.19)
x
f(i)
i = 0, 1 ∀i ∈ N (3.20)
Because of the assumption v
f(i)


















xji ≤ Cl ∀t ∈ T, l ∈ L (3.22)
xji = 0, 1 ∀i ∈ N, j ∈ P (3.23)
Now we prove the following theorem to show that for any vehicle i ∈ N, πi ≤ vj
∗
i ,
where j∗ is the optimal path assigned to i.
Theorem III.5. If there exists an uncapcitated free path between any pair of origin
and destination, and every vehicle bids zero on this free path, then payment of every
vehicle is no greater than its bid for the assigned path.
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Denote x∗−k as the optimal solution to U
∗












, ∀j ∈ P
i.e., x′ assigns vehicle k to the free alternative path, and other vehicles according to
the solution of x∗−k. Thus






This violates the optimality of U∗.
In real world, this combination of auctioned and free path system can be used
in tolling the HOV/HOT lanes and regular lanes. Further details of this issue is
discussed in section 3.4.2.
3.5.3.2 Solution With Alternative Path
We test the auction mechanism with alternative free paths. The result shows that
215 out of 12000 vehicles are assigned to the alternative free path, and the objective
value (social utility) improve by 2323. Table 3.6 shows the difference of toll collection
in these two scenarios.
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Table 3.6: Toll
Total Toll Avg. Toll
No Free Path 90621 7.55
With Free Path 43691 3.64
Although the auction with free path collect less toll (43691) than one without
(90621), the actual collection will be closer to the smaller figure. This is because
vehicles charged a toll higher than they bid may not show up.
Figure 3.15 shows the average toll paid by vehicles traveling between the same six
origin-destination pairs as in Figure 3.13.
Figure 3.16 compares the payment and bid relation before and after adding free
paths for the previous six origin-destination pairs. In each pair, we plot the payment
and bid relation with no free path in the upper half, and and result of adding free
path in the bottom half. Each panel in the figure represents a path. Each dot in
the panel represents a vehicle’s information: the x-axis is the time it arrives, y-axis
is the price it pays, and the color of the dot is the per unit time bid for this vehicle
(ci). To clearly distinguish each vehicle, we add a small random perturbation to each










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 3.15: Payment of Vehicles Travelling Between Six O-D Pairs With Paths
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(a) Without Free Path










































































































































(b) With Free Path
Figure 3.16: Payment and Bid Relation of O-D a→ β With and Without Free Path
After adding free paths, all of the tolls are less than bids, as can be seen clearly
by comparing Figure 3.16a and 3.16b.
Figure 3.22 shows how many vehicles are assigned to the free paths between these
six O-D pairs. Among these vehicles in free paths, most of them are vehicles traveling
from node a to β (colored in pink), some are traveling from s to x, and n to y. Tolls
of these paths are reduced significantly, as can be seen in Figure 3.16, 3.18 and 3.19.
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(a) Without Free Path


























































































(b) With Free Path
Figure 3.17: Payment and Bid Relation of β → a With and Without Free Path
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(a) Without Free Path




















































































































































(b) With Free Path
Figure 3.18: Payment and Bid Relation of s→ x With and Without Free Path
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(a) Without Free Path


















































































































































(b) With Free Path
Figure 3.19: Payment and Bid Relation of n→ y With and Without Free Path
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y−z−L−x−D−c−C−b−B−q−r−J−n (23) y−z−L−al−K−be−E−f−F−j−H−l−m−I−n (23) y−M−N−u−t−B−q−r−J−n (23)
● ●● ● ● ● ●● ●● ●
● ●● ● ● ● ●
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(a) Without Free Path
y−z−L−x−D−c−C−b−B−q−r−J−n (23) y−z−L−al−K−be−E−f−F−j−H−l−m−I−n (23) y−M−N−u−t−B−q−r−J−n (23)
● ●● ●● ● ● ● ●●
● ● ●● ● ●● ● ● ●● ●● ● ● ●
● ●● ●● ● ● ● ● ● ●
●● ●● ● ●● ● ● ●



























(b) With Free Path
Figure 3.20: Payment and Bid Relation of y → n With and Without Free Path
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(a) Without Free Path


























































































































(b) With Free Path

























Figure 3.22: Number of Vehicles Assigned to Free Path
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3.6 Conclusion and Future Work
We have proposed here an auction system implemented via V2I devices to toll and
allocate traffic. Participating vehicles “bid” before travel. Using these bids, the traffic
controller solves an optimization problem and assign paths and corresponding tolls to
these vehicles. A mathematical model of the auction is presented and analyzed. The
auctions system is based on VCG mechanism and thus guarantees truthful reporting
of bids.
The auction scheme is tested on two numerical experiments: first in a small net-
work of 6 links with 5100 vehicles, then in a large network of 98 links and 12000
vehicles. The computation of both of the experiments can be done in reasonable time
limit. The result of experiment one shows that the auction indeed prescribes efficient
tolls for each path at different time. Experiment two shows that in multiple origin-
destination network, tolls can sometimes be larger than the corresponding bids. We
fix this problem by adding an independent ‘free path’ for each origin-destination pair
in the auction model. We show that by adding the free path, the tolls are guaranteed
to be less than or equal to the bids.
We also analyze the computational difficulty of solving the payment problem and
propose approaches to reduce the complexity. We also discuss methods to make this
auction easier to implement in real world, such as using rolling horizon to allow for
multiple-round auction, as well as the the possibility of implementing it as a tolling
sub-system for HOV or HOT lanes.
There are three possible extensions of this work. 1) Changing the auction scheme
or developing heuristics that reduces the computational complexity of auction. Here
the classical VCG mechanism is used to determine the path assignment and toll,
but there are other available auction mechanisms that do not involve solving Integer
Programming problems. 2) Allow flexible travel time for vehicles. Instead of reporting
a fixed travel time, vehicles can report a time window of travel. 3) Introducing
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stochasticity into the model. Instead of maintaining free-flow for each link in the
network, we can allow congestion in certain links. This would require dynamically




Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V) and Vehcle-to-Infrastructure (V2I) communications are
two important technologies used in Intelligent Transportation System (ITS). Here we
develop two applications for ITS, one using V2V (Chapter II) and the other using V2I
communication (Chapter III). Chapter II describes a vehicle platoon control model
built on V2V devices, while Chapter III presents an application of a V2I system
for a combinatorial auction mechanism to allocate traffic and generate tolls. These
two models can be used separately, or used as sub-systems of an integrated ITS:
the microscopic traffic is managed through platooning, and the macroscopic traffic is
optimized by using a combinatorial auction.
In Chapter II, a vehicle platoon control method under high-latency communica-
tion environment is proposed. We use MPC approach which combines a statistical
prediction model with an optimization algorithm and give optimal control action for
each time step. We also analyze the robustness of this method using sensitivity anal-
ysis of quadratic programming. The simulation experiments performed show that
the MPC controller can react quickly to sudden braking or accelerating of leading
car, and dampen the effect of these actions as it propagates along the platoon. The
simulation also demonstrates the potential of this method to operate vehicles safely.
In Chapter III, by using V2I devices, we apply a combinatorial auction in a network
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to toll and allocate traffic. Every participating vehicle bids in order to use a path in the
network. We proposed a mathematical model to process these bids, and assign paths
and corresponding tolls to vehicles. The auction system is based on VCG mechanism
and thus guarantees truthful reporting of bids. We then test the auction mechanism
in two numerical experiments: first in a small network of 6 links with 5100 vehicles,
then on a large network of 98 links and 12000 vehicles. The result of experiment
one shows that the auction indeed prescribes efficient tolls for each path at different
time. Experiment two shows that in multiple origin-destination network, tolls can
sometimes be larger than the corresponding bids. We fix this problem by adding an
independent ‘free path’ for each origin-destination pair in the auction model. We
show that by adding the free path, the tolls are guaranteed to be less than or equal
to the bids. We also discuss methods for its implementation in the auction in real






A.1 Proof of Truthful Reporting Is a Best Strategy
Theorem 1. Truthful reporting is an optimal strategy for each vehicle driver in the
auction mechanism. Moreover, when each vehicle driver reports truthfully, the out-
come of the mechanism is one that maximizes social utility.
Proof. This is adapted from (Cramton et al., 2006, Chap. 1).
Suppose each driver i ∈ N has a intrinsic value vji for travelling in each path
j ∈ P. They report v̂ji to the central controller. Now we need to prove that reporting
v̂ji = v
j
i ,∀j is a best strategy for each driver i.
Consider any fixed profile of reports {v̂ji }i 6=k for all drivers besides k. Suppose that
when driver k reports truthfully, the resulting allocation and payment vectors are
denoted by x∗ = {xji}i∈N,j∈P and π∗ = (π1, π2, . . . , πN). But when driver k reports v̂
j
k
for each path j, the resulting assignment are denoted as x̂ = (x̂∗1, x̂
∗
2, . . . , x̂
∗
N), whereas
the resulting payment is represented by π̂ = (π̂1, π̂2, . . . , π̂N).
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